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Who is susceptible in three false memory tasks?
Rebecca M. Nicholsa and Elizabeth F. Loftusb
aSchool of Social Sciences, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, Singapore; bPsychology and Social Behavior, University of
California, Irvine, CA, USA
ABSTRACT
Decades of research show that people are susceptible to developing false memories. But if
they do so in one task, are they likely to do so in a diﬀerent one? The answer: “No”. In
the current research, a large number of participants took part in three well-established
false memory paradigms (a misinformation task, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott [DRM] list
learning paradigm, and an imagination inﬂation exercise) as well as completed several
individual diﬀerence measures. Results indicate that many correlations between false
memory variables in all three inter-paradigm comparisons are null, though some small,
positive, signiﬁcant correlations emerged. Moreover, very few individual diﬀerence variables
signiﬁcantly correlated with false memories, and any signiﬁcant correlations were rather
small. It seems likely, therefore, that there is no false memory “trait”. In other words, no
one type of person seems especially prone, or especially resilient, to the ubiquity of
memory distortion.
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As much as we would like to believe so, human memory is
not the foolproof gatekeeper of our past. Though our
memories generally serve us well in our day-to-day lives
and contribute meaning to ourselves and the physical
and social environments in which we are so deeply
embedded, we do not encode and retrieve in a failsafe
record-and-playback manner. Rather, our memory pro-
cesses can be vulnerable to contamination and distortion.
Our memories are malleable, susceptible to inﬂuence from
suggestion, and can even contain whole events that never
actually occurred.
The past four decades have seen an explosion of
research investigating the psychological underpinnings
of faulty memory (for a review of some of this work
and its motivations, see Brainerd & Reyna, 2005 or
Loftus, 2017). This collective body of work has shown
that memories can be manipulated experimentally. This
holds for memories of simple events created in the lab
and memories for perceptually rich and personally mean-
ingful events from one’s past. What’s less known,
however, is whether individuals who are particularly
prone to developing false memories in one context are
also prone to developing phenomenologically diﬀerent
false memories in other contexts. We examined this
issue using three commonly used paradigms for demon-
strating memory malleability. We describe their methods,
their theoretical bases, and individual diﬀerences that
predict susceptibility below.
The misinformation eﬀect
Background and theory
One commonly used paradigm involves exposure to misin-
formation about a past memory (Loftus, Miller, & Burns,
1978). In a typical misinformation study, participants
witness some type of event and later are given some mis-
information (i.e., inconsistent post-event information)
about that event. When tested on their memory for
event details, participants often incorporate pieces of mis-
information into their memory of the original event and
report those details as such. For example, participants in
one study viewed a slideshow in which a burglar picked
up a hammer, then sometime later read misleading infor-
mation that the burglar handled a screwdriver instead. At
test, they were asked whether they saw a hammer or a
screwdriver in the original slideshow. Across experiments,
participants selected the misinformation item – the screw-
driver – 66% of the time, representing a typical pattern of
memory impairment in misinformation studies (McCloskey
& Zaragoza, 1985).
One of the predominant theoretical explanations for the
misinformation eﬀect is that of errors in source monitoring
(Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993). The source moni-
toring account states that when participants encode the
misinformation, they may not adequately encode the
source of the post-event information and thus erroneously
attribute it to the original event (for reviews, see Belli &
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Loftus, 1994; Mitchell & Johnson, 2000; Zaragoza, Lane,
Ackil, & Chambers, 1997). This can easily happen because
the original information and misinformation share some
commonalities (e.g., the referent event and the context in
which those events occur) that inherently make source dis-
tinction diﬃcult. Johnson et al. (1993) identiﬁed a number
of conditions in which source misattributions are particu-
larly likely, which include imagining perceptual detail at
the time of encoding misinformation, encoding misinfor-
mation that is particularly congruent with the overall
meaning of the event, and experiencing stress or fatigue
during encoding of the misinformation.
Another approach to explaining misinformation false
memories is fuzzy trace theory (FTT; Brainerd & Reyna,
2005). FTT posits two types of mental representations for
memory: verbatim traces, which are detailed, often vivid,
direct representations of the past, and gist traces, which
capture overall meaning of the memory but not its
speciﬁc qualities. According to FTT, endorsement of misin-
formation is supported by both verbatim and gist trace
strength. An individual may misremember the item as a
screwdriver because they recall this verbatim information
from the misinformation phase, or they may misremember
the item as a screwdriver because it is consistent with the
overall gist memory that the item was a tool.
Individual diﬀerences
Compared to the large corpus of research on the misinfor-
mation eﬀect, relatively few studies explore individual
diﬀerences in susceptibility. Age is one of them; older
adults have shown to be more susceptible to memory
errors, and this is likely because of decreased frontal lobe
functioning and thus poorer source memory discriminabil-
ity (Roediger & Geraci, 2007). Other research has shown
that people who report stronger ability to imagine visual
images are more likely to endorse misinformation (Cann
& Katz, 2005; Eisen, Gomes, Lorber, Perez, & Uchishiba,
2013; Tomes & Katz, 1997), though imagery ability has
also been linked to a close conﬁdence-accuracy relation-
ship in the misinformation paradigm (Tomes & Katz,
2000). Furthermore, a positive association has been
found between subscales of the Openness and Agreeable-
ness dimensions of the NEO Personality Inventory and mis-
information false memory (Liebman et al., 2002), which is
consistent with the idea that social factors play a role in
the acceptance of misinformation (McCloskey & Zaragoza,
1985). Furthermore, the degree to which participants self-
report dissociative experiences has also been shown as a
predictor of incorporation of misinformation into
memory (Eisen & Carlson, 1998; Eisen, Morgan, & Mickes,
2002; Hekkanen & McEvoy, 2002), which is not surprising
given that those who dissociate (particularly those with
pathological dissociation) are likely to suﬀer from a
number of cognitive problems that include limits in
source monitoring (Putnam, 1995).
In addition, cognitive factors seem to play a role in
understanding one’s susceptibility to the misinformation
eﬀect. For example, working memory has been shown to
be negatively correlated with misinformation-related false
memory (Calvillo, 2014; Jaschinski & Wentura, 2002). Rela-
tively low intelligence coupled with poor perceptual
capacity is also associated with susceptibility to misinfor-
mation (Zhu et al., 2010a). More speciﬁcally, individuals
with a low degree of cognitive ability combined with
traits such as low fear of negative evaluation, low need
to avoid harm, high cooperativeness, high dependence
on reward, and high self-directedness seemed to be
especially susceptible to the inﬂuence of misinformation
(Zhu et al., 2010b). It may be the case that a speciﬁc
threshold of cognitive ability is required both to accurately
recall witnessed events and to discern the sources of
potentially competing information about those events.
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott paradigm
Background and theory
Nearly twenty years after the misinformation eﬀect was
demonstrated, Roediger and McDermott rediscovered the
work of Deese (1959) and developed what became
another widely used experimental manipulation designed
to induce false memories, the Deese-Roediger-McDermott
(or DRM) paradigm (Roediger & McDermott, 1995; Stadler,
Roediger, & McDermott, 1999). In the DRM, participants
view or hear lists of semantically-related words such as
note, sound, piano, sing, radio, band, etc., which converge
upon a critical, non-presented semantic associate (in this
case, music). Participants are tested on their memory for
studied items, new but unrelated control (distractor) items,
and of most interest, critical items. The rate of false mem-
ories for critical items during encoding often approximates
or exceeds that of veridical memory for studied items, and
these patterns have been robustly replicated in the DRM lit-
erature (for reviews of the DRM, see Gallo, 2006; 2010).
One theory that accounts for false memories in the DRM
is the activation-monitoring hypothesis (Roediger &
McDermott, 2000; Roediger, Watson, McDermott, & Gallo,
2001). This theory posits that the critical item is mentally
generated both at encoding and potentially during retrie-
val as a result of spreading activation, a process by which
nodes that represent concepts in a semantic network are
activated due to the proximity and magnitude of activation
of other nodes (Underwood, 1965). Faulty monitoring
during study then produces source confusions at test,
and participants mistakenly remember the critical item as
having been presented, instead of merely cognitively acti-
vated, at study. FTT has also been proposed to explain DRM
memories; from an FTT perspective, false recognition of
music at test may occur because it is consistent with
overall gist memory that the list contained items conver-
ging upon music (Cabeza & Lennartson, 2005).
Individual diﬀerences
Relative to the misinformation eﬀect, individual predictors
of susceptibility to false memories of critical lures in the
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DRM have been extensively studied. Just as with the misin-
formation eﬀect, age is negatively correlated with DRM
false memories in adults (Balota et al., 1999; Butler, McDa-
niel, Dornburg, Price, & Roediger, 2004; Gallo, Bell, Beier, &
Schacter, 2006; Kensinger & Schacter, 1999). With respect
to the NEO Personality Inventory, extraversion has been
shown to correlate with false memory susceptibility.
Speciﬁcally, extraverts have been shown to falsely remem-
ber more critical lures than both introverts and ambiverts
(Sanford & Fisk, 2009). This ﬁnding is consistent with evi-
dence that suggests extraversion is correlated with heigh-
tened arousal, which in turn increases spreading activation
and thus leads to greater eﬀects of semantic priming (see
Matthews & Harley, 1993).
Furthermore, many studies have found a positive corre-
lation between dissociative experience and false memories
in the DRM (Clancy, McNally, Schacter, Lenzenweger, &
Pitman, 2002; Clancy, Schacter, McNally, & Pitman, 2000;
Dehon, Bastin, & Larøi, 2008; Wilkinson & Hyman, 1998;
Winograd, Peluso, & Glover, 1998; Zoellner, Foa, Brigidi, &
Przeworski, 2000), though some studies have failed to
observe such a relationship (e.g., Bremner, Shobe, & Kihl-
strom, 2000; Geraerts, Smeets, Jelicic, van Heerden, &
Merckelbach, 2005; Platt, Lacey, Iobst, & Finkelman, 1998;
Wright, Startup, & Mathews, 2005). Positive correlations
also exist between DRM false memories and measures of
delusional ideation (Dehon et al., 2008; Laws & Bhatt,
2005) and fantasy proneness (Geraerts et al., 2005) as
well as imagery ability (Winograd et al., 1998). The discov-
ery of these relationships suggest that an overall predispo-
sition toward moving thoughts from consciousness, or
otherwise holding imaginative beliefs more generally,
may be related to overall worse memory (and more speciﬁ-
cally in this case, a greater likelihood of using similarity to
judge critical lures as having been actually encoded).
Researchers have also studied a number of cognitive
variables as predictors of false memories in the DRM. A
growing body of research has demonstrated a negative
correlation with working memory (Parker, Garry, Engle,
Harper, & Clifaseﬁ, 2008; Peters, Jelicic, Haas, & Merckel-
bach, 2006; Peters, Jelicic, Verbeek, & Merckelbach, 2007).
This relationship appears to be stronger under conditions
that call for a high degree of source monitoring, such as
when participants are forewarned about the types of mem-
ories errors the DRM tends to produce (Watson, Bunting,
Poole, & Conway, 2005). On the other hand, individuals
who report a higher number of everyday mental errors
(or who report less cognitive eﬃciency) have demon-
strated reduced susceptibility to endorsement of critical
lures (Raymaekers, Peters, Smeets, Abidi, & Merckelbach,
2011), suggesting that those with a more optimistic view
of their own cognitive eﬃciency may have a global ten-
dency to make liberal memory judgments, which in turn
leads them to endorse more critical lures. Though the
DRM does produce memory errors, results such as these
illuminate the rationale to consider response biases in
addition to (not instead of) memory errors.
Another cognitive variable implicated in individual
diﬀerence research on the DRM is cognitive style, or
one’s preferred general approach to information proces-
sing (see Sternberg, 1997, for a review). One way to
measure cognitive style is with the Need for Cognition
(NFC) scale, which measures the degree to which one
prefers to engage in eﬀortful thinking (Cacioppo & Petty,
1982). Individuals higher in NFC have been shown to be
more susceptible to DRM errors in both tests of recognition
(Graham, 2007) and recall (Leding, 2011; Wootan & Leding,
2015). It is perhaps the case that those with greater NFC
engage in more elaborative cognitive processing or have
more integrated semantic networks that allow for easier
false retrieval of nonpresented critical lures at test. There
is also evidence to suggest that one’s Faith in Intuition
(FI), a construct that is orthogonal to NFC in the Rational-
Experiential Inventory (see Epstein, Pacini, DenesRaj, &
Heier, 1996) and which gauges one’s reliance on intuitive
thought, is positively correlated with false memories in
the DRM (Nichols & Loftus, 2009). When music is presented
at test, participants may experience an immediate and
intuitive feeling that it had been presented during encod-
ing, and this may be an especially operant mechanism for
false memory development in those who tend to rely on
their “gut feelings” more often than others more generally.
Lastly, it has also been shown that people with a ﬁeld-
dependent processing style, who rely on background and
holistic information in order to process globally, are more
susceptible to false memories than their ﬁeld-independent
counterparts, who can more easily identify individual, con-
stituent elements apart from the whole (Corson, Verrier, &
Bucic, 2009). This is an intuitive ﬁnding consistent with
implications from spreading activation theory; DRM items
themselves contribute to part of a whole (the relevant
list, which semantically converges upon the lure), and
those who are more likely to process those items holisti-
cally are more likely to endorse the lure.
Finally, it is important to note brieﬂy that the proneness
to DRM errors itself is considered itself a stable individual
diﬀerence; one study demonstrated a correlation of r
= .76 between false alarms to lures at Time 1 and those
of Time 2, two weeks later (Blair, Lenton, & Hastie, 2002).
Self-relevant false memories: imagination inﬂation
Background and theory
Several studies have shown that people can develop false
memories for whole autobiographical events. During the
highly proﬁled repressed memory cases of the 1990s,
when claimants purported to have had experienced but
subsequently repressed unspeakable crimes such as ritual
satanic abuse (see Bottoms & Davis, 1997), it became
clear that more work was needed to investigate whether
or not memories for entire events could be implanted.
And so was born a new line of false memory research:
that of personally relevant false memories. Unlike their mis-
information and DRM counterparts, these memories may
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be comprised of whole, richly detailed events of one’s own
personal past (see Loftus & Bernstein, 2005 for a review).
One of the ﬁrst studies to implant false autobiographical
memories did so with the lost-in-the-mall technique
(Loftus & Pickrell, 1995). In this study, participants were
given short narratives of events that occurred in the past,
and for all participants in the study, one of the stories
was about having gotten lost and subsequently found by
a family member in a shopping mall during childhood.
Unbeknownst to the participants, family members had pre-
viously veriﬁed this event never to have happened for any
of the participants. In the original study, a sizeable minority
(i.e., 25%) of participants remembered the ﬁctitious lost-in-
the-mall event after being subjected to a suggestive
interview.
Since then, self-relevant false memories have been
implanted using a variety of experimental techniques,
including dream interpretation (Loftus & Mazzoni, 1998;
Mazzoni, Lombardo, Malvagia, & Loftus, 1999), guided visu-
alisation (Paddock, Terranova, Kwok, & Halpern, 2000), hyp-
nosis (Spanos, 1996; Spanos, Burgess, Burgess, Samuels, &
Blois, 1999), false feedback (Bernstein, Laney, Morris, &
Loftus, 2005a, 2005b; Laney, Morris, Bernstein, Wakeﬁeld,
& Loftus, 2008; Laney & Loftus, 2008), doctored photo-
graphs (Strange, Sutherland, & Garry, 2006; Wade, Garry,
Don Read, & Lindsay, 2002), and doctored video (Nash &
Wade, 2009; Nash, Wade, & Lindsay, 2009). Another tech-
nique used to implant false memories is guided imagin-
ation (Garry, Manning, Loftus, & Sherman, 1996). In a
typical guided imagination study, participants are given a
number of childhood events and are asked to rate their
conﬁdence that they experienced each event as a child.
Participants are later asked to imagine one of the events
and, sometime later, ﬁll out another identical life events
inventory. An increase in conﬁdence from the ﬁrst inven-
tory to the second for the critical event (relative to the
other, control events) lends evidence toward the formation
of a false memory for that event, and this eﬀect has been
termed imagination inﬂation (Garry et al., 1996). This
phenomenon is often further supported by the partici-
pants’ report of a belief or an actual memory that the
event occurred (see Bernstein et al., 2005a, 2005b for
studies that utilise memory-or-belief questionnaires).
Source misattributions may help explain imagination
inﬂation. Whereas the misinformation eﬀect is due to exter-
nal source attributions (to the original event instead of to
the post-event narrative or questioning), imagination
inﬂation is believed to be due to internal misattributions
(to one’s autobiography instead of to one’s imagination;
Johnson et al., 1993). Another proposed explanation for
imagination inﬂation comes from the familiarity misattribu-
tion hypothesis (Jacoby, Kelley, & Dywan, 1989), which
explains that when an event is imagined, the imagination
exercise renders the event more familiar and cognitively
available, which in turn results in false recollection.
Researchers have demonstrated, however, that imagin-
ation inﬂation is more likely to occur when participants
incorporate detailed sensory elaborations during imagin-
ation and not when imagined events lack sensory cues or
are otherwise not imagined with such perceptual precision
(Thomas, Bulevich, & Loftus, 2003). Thus, it is possible that
feelings of familiarity can facilitate the imagination inﬂation
eﬀect, but it seems likely that source misattributions
account for inﬂation over and above explanations related
to increased general familiarity or ease of processing.
One criticism of imagination inﬂation studies is that the
imagination exercise actually allows the participant to
access a previously inaccessible yet true event from one’s
childhood, and the increase in conﬁdence is an artifact of
this process (Pezdek & Salim, 2011). One experimental
variant of the imagination inﬂation paradigm addresses
this concern. In this modiﬁed paradigm, adapted from
Goﬀ and Roediger (1998), participants come into the lab
and hear a list of actions, some of which are everyday
tasks (e.g., ﬂip a coin) and some of which are bizarre (e.g.,
kiss the magnifying glass). At a later time, they return and
imagine some of the performed events as well as some
novel events. Finally, participants return later for a third
and ﬁnal time in which their memory is tested for the
actions performed in Session 1. One study that utilised
these methods found that repeated imagination led
people to report that both everyday and bizarre actions
were performed during Session 1 when in fact they were
merely presented, imagined, or even neither of the two
(Thomas & Loftus, 2002). Because the referent events
were controlled by the experimenters, the research directly
addressed the issue concerning the potential access of true
memories and conﬁrmed imagination indeed inﬂates false
memory.
Individual diﬀerences
Few studies have examined individual diﬀerences in sus-
ceptibility to false memories that develop through
guided imagination. However, it is useful to turn to the
small literature that has identiﬁed individual diﬀerence pre-
dictors of false autobiographical memories across other
experimental manipulation types. Most of these individual
diﬀerences are concerned with traits that are captured by
disengagement from reality. For example, one study
demonstrated that participants were more likely to falsely
remember a childhood event (ostensibly described by
their parents) if they were more prone to dissociation as
well as if they scored low on extraversion but were inter-
viewed by an experimenter who scored high on extraver-
sion (Porter, Birt, Yuille, & Lehman, 2000). Another study
utilising a similar technique also found a positive associ-
ation with proneness to dissociation as well as fantasy pro-
neness (Hyman & Billings, 1998). In a study that employed
guided visualisation, however, dissociation was not related
and participants’ self-reported extraversion, not introver-
sion, was positively correlated with false memories
(Paddock et al., 2000). In yet another study in which partici-
pants kept a diary of events and encountered an unex-
pected memory test six months later, memory intrusions
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were found to be related to fantasy proneness but not dis-
sociation, absorption, or suggestibility (Horselenberg,
Merckelbach, van Breukelen, & Wessel, 2004). Absorption,
a construct closely related to hypnotisability and which
has been described as “a disposition for having episodes
of ‘total’ attention that fully engage one’s representational
(i.e., perceptual, enactive, imaginative, and ideational)
resources” (Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), has been shown
to predict false memories related to the OJ Simpson trial
in a study of more naturally occurring memory intrusions
(Platt et al., 1998).
As far as guided imagination is concerned speciﬁcally,
only a few studies have identiﬁed individual diﬀerence pre-
dictors of developing a false memory. Working memory
has been shown to be negatively correlated with false
memory for imagined events in the lab (Peters, Smeets,
Giesbrecht, Jelicic, & Merckelbach, 2007) and imagined
childhood events (Calvillo, Vasquez, & Pesavento, 2018).
Proneness to dissociation has correlated positively with
inﬂation (Heaps & Nash, 1999) though some studies have
failed to ﬁnd such a relationship (Horselenberg et al.,
2000; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). Hypnotic suggestibility
has also been shown as a predictor of inﬂation (Heaps &
Nash, 1999), as has the ability to visualise or generate
mental imagery (Horselenberg et al., 2000), though this
relationship has not held in other studies (Heaps & Nash,
1999; Mazzoni & Memon, 2003). It is clear from the litera-
ture review of imagination inﬂation and of autobiographi-
cal false memories more generally that there is mixed
evidence for many potential individual diﬀerence predic-
tors. This is especially true for those traits that cluster
around disengagement from conscious awareness such
as dissociation, absorption, hypnotisability, and fantasy
proneness.
Relatedness of paradigms
Theoretical foundations
The three paradigms reviewed thus far all reveal conditions
under which memory for events can be manipulated and
distorted. Their theoretical underpinnings, however, vary.
The misinformation eﬀect can be accounted for by
source monitoring theory, which contends that people
inaccurately remember misleading information as having
occurred during the actual event and not from some
post-event source. The DRM can be explained by a combi-
nation of monitoring and activation theories in which
people misremember studying the critical item during
encoding because it was cognitively activated instead of
actually presented and encoded. Finally, source monitoring
confusions apply to a typical imagination exercise as well,
though the confusion lies from internal, rather than exter-
nal, sources. From a FTT perspective, gist traces support
false memory in both DRM and misinformation tasks,
while verbatim traces support false memory in the misin-
formation paradigm (Reyna, Corbin, Weldon, & Brainerd,
2016).
The methodological and theoretical considerations of
each type of false memory combine to form a good launch-
ing point from which to consider whether performance in
one paradigm can itself predict performance in another.
That is, to the extent that one falsely recognises the critical
lure in the DRM, will this predict his or her proneness to
falsely recall an event from the past that never actually
happened? Can one’s propensity to remember a critical
event during an imagination inﬂation exercise predict the
overall likelihood of endorsing post-event information in
a typical misinformation experiment? Does the extent to
which one remembers a misleading detail about an
event inform the likelihood of developing false memories
in a word-list task?
Empirical evidence
A few studies have explored possible correlations between
false memories arising from diﬀerent paradigms. One study
found that the 32% of children in their sample who devel-
oped a false memory after an interview about a ﬁctitious
event also displayed higher DRM rates compared to chil-
dren who did not develop such a false memory (Otgaar,
Verschuere, Meijer, & van Oorsouw, 2012). Among studies
of adults, one reports a small positive correlation of r
= .12 between endorsement of misinformation in a stan-
dard task and false memories in the DRM (Zhu, Chen,
Loftus, Lin, & Dong, 2013). However, other studies have
failed to ﬁnd a relationship between misinformation and
DRM false memories (Calvillo & Parong, 2016; Monds,
Paterson, & Kemp, 2017; Ost et al., 2013), between DRM
and false event suggestion (Otgaar & Candel, 2011), or
between imagination inﬂations for childhood events and
for simple actions performed in the laboratory (Calvillo
et al., 2018). Only two studies to date have examined cor-
relations between false memories in misinformation,
DRM, and false event suggestion manipulations, and
both failed to ﬁnd any correlations among them (Bernstein,
Scoboria, Desjarlais, & Soucie, 2018; Patihis, Frenda, &
Loftus, 2018). Overall, the research describes largely null
relationships between false memories of diﬀerent para-
digms, but none so far have explored false memories
speciﬁcally in the misinformation, DRM, and imagination
inﬂation paradigms all within subjects. This study aims to
address this need.
A note on special populations
There is some evidence that people who can recount extre-
mely anomalous or altogether impossible events are more
likely to commit memory errors in classic false memory
experiments. The bulk of this evidence comes from
research conducted with the DRM paradigm. One study
found that participants who self-reported at least one
space alien abduction both falsely recognised and falsely
recalled more critical lures than a sample of non-abductee
controls (Clancy et al., 2002). Another study similarly found
that people who report having past-lives (which is, under
careful consideration, seemingly even less plausible than
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an alien abduction) also displayed heightened false recog-
nition and recall rates in the DRM than controls who only
reported having one, current, on-going life (Meyersburg,
Bogdan, Gallo, & McNally, 2009).
There has been some lingering debate regarding the
existence of memory repression (see Patihis, Ho, Tingen,
Lilienfeld, & Loftus, 2014; Brewin & Andrews, 2014;
Patihis, Lilienfeld, Ho, & Loftus, 2014), but it is of relevance
to the discussion of special populations to describe
research based on samples who report these types of
these experiences. One study found that women who
reported recovering repressed memories of childhood
sexual abuse (CSA) exhibited higher DRM rates than
women who never reported having forgotten the abuse
(Clancy et al., 2000). The same pattern was found for a
group of women who reported repressing their CSA experi-
ences relative to women reporting either no abuse or no
lapse in memory for their abuse (Geraerts et al., 2005). Fur-
thermore, a sample of women who reported recovering
memories of traumatic childhood sexual abuse during psy-
chotherapy also exhibited higher false memory rates in the
DRM that women who experienced childhood abuse but
who were able to recall the event after simple relevant
cues (Geraerts et al., 2009).
The overarching idea of these studies is that those who
are prone to developing a false memory from their past
due to an imagination, suggestion, or something else
may also be susceptible to memory distortion in a labora-
tory setting. It is diﬃcult to conceive a precise mechanism
that explains these patterns, in part because these studies
are correlational, but also because false memories in the
DRM and false autobiographical memories are the result
of diﬀerent manipulations and are themselves qualitatively
dissimilar. It is perhaps the case, however, that the related-
ness of these memories is most evident for people who lay
at one extreme of the proneness spectrum for one or more
paradigms. It may also be true that they capture extreme
ends of trait distributions that are correlates of false mem-
ories across diﬀerent contexts.
Overview of the research
The ﬁrst of two primary goals was to investigate the
relationships between memory performance in three
false memory paradigms administered within subjects:
misinformation, DRM, and imagination inﬂation. Though
the use of three paradigms is a methodological and logistic
challenge, the beneﬁt of this research design is that any
pattern of results will facilitate understanding of the com-
monalities of false memories that are the result of
diﬀerent methodologies, that are themselves qualitatively
unique, and that may be explained by diﬀerent theoretical
mechanisms.
Secondly, this study investigates a number of individual
diﬀerences as predictors of false memories for each of the
paradigms. The purpose of including these measures is to
(a) replicate patterns in a normal college-aged sample that
have been previously reported in the literature, (b) identify
new individual diﬀerence predictors of false memory for
one or more particular paradigms, (c) investigate which
of these measures, if any, seem to commonly predict
false memories in all paradigms, and (d) use individual
diﬀerence correlates to reﬁne proposed mechanisms for
false memory development.
Method
Participants
Undergraduate students from a large public university in
California (N = 373; NFemale = 277, NMale = 89, NUnreported =
7; Mage = 20.8, Asian 42.6%, Latino 25.1%, Caucasian/
White 15.3%, Middle Eastern 4.6%, African-American/
Black 1.6%, Hawaiian or Other Paciﬁc Islander 0.5%, U.S.
Indian 0.0%, Multiple ethnicities 9.0%, Other 1.1%) partici-
pated in the study for course credit. Of these participants,
n = 297 completed the misinformation task, n = 283 com-
pleted the DRM task, n = 244 completed imagination
inﬂation, and n = 367 completed individual diﬀerence
measures. Each of these tasks is described in further
detail below.
Materials
False memory paradigms
Misinformation. Participants completed a three-stage mis-
information task adapted from Takarangi, Parker, and Garry
(2006) using Qualtrics software. In the ﬁrst stage, partici-
pants viewed a silent 6 min 28 s video of a double-crossing
electrician who steals personal property while on the job in
a client’s home. At the conclusion of the video, participants
responded to trivia statements for 12 min in order to
prevent mental rehearsal of the events in the video.
Participants then read a narrative account of the events
witnessed in the video. Each sentence in the narrative
appeared one at a time, and participants were able to
advance to the next sentence at his or her own pace. The
narrative contained eight critical items from the video:
bed, picture, van, time, mug, magazine, drink, and cap. In
the narrative, four of the critical items were presented as
misinformation items, and four were presented as control
items. For example, Eric drinks from a can of Coke in the
video. In the narrative, the coke item either presented as
misinformation (“Eric helped himself to a can of Pepsi
from the fridge”) or with consistent information (“Eric
helped himself to a can of soft drink from the fridge”)
that served for comparison. Participants were randomly
assigned to one of two narrative conditions: in Condition
1, four items in the narrative were misinformation items,
and the other four items were controls. In Condition 2,
the reverse was true: misinformation items from Condition
1 were control items and control items from Condition 1
were misinformation items. After participants read the nar-
rative, they completed basic addition and subtraction math
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problems for ﬁve minutes again intended to prevent
rehearsal of items in the narrative.
The third and ﬁnal stage of the task involved a recog-
nition test. Participants completed a 20-item, two-alterna-
tive forced-choice memory test about events in the
original ﬁlm of Eric the Electrician. For each item, partici-
pants also indicated whether they remembered their
answers from the video, the narrative, both, or neither. Of
the 20 items, four concerned events that contained mis-
leading details in the narrative, four probed about events
that contained consistent information in the narrative,
and the other twelve questions were ﬁllers in which partici-
pants addressed items they both viewed in the video and
read about in the narrative. For the eight critical questions,
the answer alternatives consisted of the correct item (such
as Coke) or the misinformation item (such as Pepsi).
Whether the incorrect alternative for each of these was a
misinformation item or a foil depended on the condition
the participant was in during the narrative stage.
DRM. Participants viewed the DRM list-learning task in a
Microsoft PowerPoint slideshow also embedded into Qual-
trics software. Before viewing the presentation, partici-
pants were informed that they would see a series of
words and that they should try to remember them to the
best of their ability. Immediately following this instruction,
participants viewed 15 DRM word lists adapted from
Stadler et al., 1999 (anger, chair, doctor, fruit, king, moun-
tain, music, needle, rough, sleep, smoke, sweet, thief, trash,
and window). Each word was presented for 1 s followed
by a 3 s pause between lists. At the conclusion of the
DRM presentation, participants completed the imagination
inﬂation test (see the following section), which also pro-
vided a retention interval ﬁller. Following that test, partici-
pants completed a 120-item DRM recognition test. The
recognition test contained 15 critical items (one from
each presented list), 45 studied items (taken from serial
positions 1, 8, and 10 of each list), and 60 new, unrelated
distractor items (also drawn from critical items and items
in serial positions 1, 8, and 10, of lists not used in the pres-
entation). For each item in the recognition test, participants
judged whether they had seen it (“OLD”) or had not seen it
(“NEW”) previously in the slideshow and provided a conﬁ-
dence judgment for their decision using a scale anchored
at 1 (Not Conﬁdent) to 5 (Very Conﬁdent). For each item
judged “OLD”, participants also indicated whether they
had a speciﬁc memory for having seen the word (“REMEM-
BER”) or if they knew it had been presented but did not
experience an actual recollection of the word or could
remember any details about it (“KNOW”). These indices
were used to distinguish memories from beliefs,
respectively.
Imagination inﬂation. The imagination inﬂation task,
adapted from Goﬀ and Roediger (1998), took place over
three in-lab sessions. In Session 1, participants heard 54
action short statements (e.g., push the toy car) and either
performed them for 15 s (18 statements), imagined per-
forming them for 15 s (18 statements), or only heard the
action and then completed math problems for 15 s (to
prevent mental rehearsal until the next statement was pre-
sented; 18 statements). Half of the action statements
included an object (e.g., ﬂatten the clay) and nine were non-
object action statements (e.g., nod in agreement).
After a one-week retention interval, participants
advanced through 44 action statements, presented one
at a time on individual computers, for which they were
instructed to take a few moments to close their eyes and
imagine performing the action. After each imagination,
participants provided a vividness rating for what they
had imagined to help ensure compliance with the imagin-
ation instruction. After the imagination exercise, partici-
pants were reminded of their appointment for Session 3
and dismissed.
Participants returned for the third and ﬁnal study session
exactly one week after Session 2. This session began with
the DRM exercise. Immediately following the DRM recog-
nition test, participants completed the ﬁnal portion of the
imagination inﬂation paradigm: a recognition test for the
action statements presented during Session 1. Each test
item was followed by a conﬁdence judgment, similar to
the ones made in the DRM, from 1 (Not Conﬁdent) to 5
(Very Conﬁdent). Upon completion of Session 3, participants
were thanked for their time, fully debriefed on the purpose
of the study, and awarded participation credit.
Individual diﬀerences
Demographics. Participants ﬁlled out a basic demo-
graphics questionnaire that included questions about
their gender, age, ethnicity, number of years speaking
English, current GPA, and SAT scores.
Trait personality. Personality dimensions of openness,
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, neuroti-
cism were measured using the 44-item Big Five Inventory
(John, Donahue, & Kentle, 1991; John, Naumann, & Soto,
2008). Participants rated their agreement with each item
on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = Disagree Strongly; 5 = Agree
Strongly).
Cognitive ability and style. Overall cognitive ability was
gauged with the 150-item Over-claiming Questionnaire
(OCQ; Paulhus & Harms, 2004; Paulhus, Harms, Bruce, &
Lysy, 2003), which asks participants to rate their familiarity
with a number of historical, scientiﬁc, and cultural items
on a 5-point Likert scale (0 = never heard of it; 4 = very fam-
iliar). To measure cognitive style, participants completed
both the 18-item Need for Cognition (NFC) subscale and
12-item Faith in Intuition (FI) subscale of the Rational-Experi-
ential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996). For both scales,
participants indicated how characteristic each statement
is of them using a Likert scale (1 = extremely uncharacteris-
tic; 7 = extremely characteristic). Participants also com-
pleted the Cognitive Reﬂection Task (CRT; Frederick, 2005),
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a three-itemmeasure designed to gauge a subject’s willing-
ness and ability to suppress an intuitive but incorrect
answer to a problem and arrive at a correct answer.
Finally, participants completed the Vividness of Visual
Imagery Questionnaire (VVIQ; Cui, Jeter, Yang, Montague,
& Eagleman, 2007; Marks, 1973), which measures how
vividly one is able to produce mental images. Participants
visualised a number of statements and indicated the vivid-
ness of each visual image using a Likert scale (1 = no image,
you are only thinking of the object; 5 = image is perfectly
clear and as vivid as normal vision).
Disengagement from reality. Participants completed the
Dissociative Experiences Scale (DES C; Wright & Loftus,
1999), a measure designed to investigate proneness to dis-
sociation, by rating the frequency of such experiences on an
11-point scale. Absorption was measured with the Tellegen
Absorption Scale (TAS; Tellegen & Atkinson, 1974), for which
participants rated the frequency of absorptive items on a 4-
point scale (1 = never; 4 = always). Finally, participants also
completed a measure of fantasy proneness, the Creative
Experiences Questionnaire (CEQ; Merckelbach, Horselen-
berg, & Muris, 2001). For this scale, participants indicated
whether or not they experienced as a child, or tend to
experience as an adult, events that that involve fantasising.
Religiosity. Participants’ internal and external religiosity
was measured using the 20-item Age Universal Religious
Orientation Scale (AUROS; Gorsuch & Venable, 1983).
Anomalous experiences. Self-reported paranormal and/or
anomalous experiences were investigated with the Anoma-
lous/Paranormal Experience Subscale of the Anomalous
Experiences Inventory (AEI; Gallagher, Kumar, & Pekala, 1994).
Procedure
The order of events for all three sessions appears in Table 1.
Study procedures occurred over three separate in-lab ses-
sions in which up to ﬁve participants participated at a time.
When participants arrived for Session 1, they ﬁrst read an
IRB-approved study information sheet and consented to
participate in all subsequent research activities. Partici-
pants were also informed that they could withdraw from
participation at any time without receiving any penalty.
After consenting to participate, participants completed
the demographics questionnaire followed by all other indi-
vidual diﬀerence measures presented in a randomised
order. At the end of the questionnaires, participants com-
pleted an attention check (adapted from Oppenheimer,
Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009). All procedures up to this
point were administered on individual computers. They
then engaged in the ﬁrst part of the imagination inﬂation
exercise in which they either performed, imagined, or
merely heard the 54 action statements. After the partici-
pants heard all 54 action statements, they were reminded
of their two future in-lab sessions and dismissed.
Session 2 occurred exactly one week after Session 1, and
all elements of Session 2 took place on the participants’ indi-
vidual computers. When participants ﬁrst arrived, they com-
pleted the entire misinformation paradigm on the
computer: they viewed the original event, completed the
trivia-question ﬁller task, read the narrative containing mis-
information, worked on the math-problem ﬁller task, and
then completed the forced-choice recognition test about
original event details. Upon completion, participants
engaged in the second part of the imagination inﬂation pro-
cedure. During this time, 144 action statements appeared to
participants one at a time on their computer screens. Partici-
pants were instructed that for each statement, they should
take a few moments to close their eyes and imagine per-
forming each action. After each imagination, participants
provided a vividness rating for what was imagined to help
ensure that they were imagining the actions. After partici-
pants completed these imaginations and their vividness
ratings on their own time, they were reminded of their
appointment for Session 3 and dismissed.
Participants returned for their third and ﬁnal session
exactly one week after Session 2. This session began with
the DRM slideshow and recognition test. Immediately fol-
lowing the test, participants completed the ﬁnal portion
of the imagination inﬂation paradigm: a recognition test
for the action statements presented during Session 1. All
components of Session 3 were also completed on individ-
ual computers. At the completion of Session 3, participants
were thanked for their time, fully debriefed on the purpose
of the study, and awarded participation credit through the
university’s human subject pool.
Results
Attention check
Of the 367 participants who encountered the attention
check, 21 did not pass. However, all study procedures
Table 1. Study procedures.
Session 1
Study information sheet
Individual diﬀerence measures
Hear, imagine, or perform imagination inﬂation action statements
Session 2 (one week after Session 1)
Misinformation video
Filler task
Misinformation narrative
Filler task
Misinformation test
Imagine imagination inﬂation action statements
Session 3 (one week after Session 2)
DRM slideshow
DRM recognition test
Imagination inﬂation recognition test
Debrieﬁng
Notes: The misinformation is paradigm was contained entirely in Session 2,
the DRM paradigm was contained entirely in Session 3, and the imagin-
ation inﬂation paradigm spanned all three sessions. Subjects completed
all individual diﬀerence questionnaires in Session 1.
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took place in the lab under the supervision of a research
assistant, and their recognition memory in all three para-
digms did not diﬀer signiﬁcantly from those who passed
the check. Therefore, their data were included in all
analyses.
False memories
The nature of this research requires a suﬃcient supply of
memory distortions to be able to explore the relationships
between them. To preview the ﬁndings, all three memory
manipulations reliably produced false memories. Further-
more, all participants developed false memories of some
kind. Of the 297 participants who completed the misinfor-
mation paradigm, only eight failed to falsely endorse any
misinformation items. Of the 283 participants who com-
pleted the DRM, only two others did not falsely recognise
any critical lures. Of the 244 participants who completed
the imagination inﬂation exercise, only one other failed
to judge any unheard but later imagined statements as
heard.
The misinformation paradigm
Memory and conﬁdence judgments. Participants were
more accurate for control items (M = .77, SD = .21) than
for items for which they were misled (M = .40, SD = .27), t
(296) = 19.18, p < .001, Cohen’s d = 1.55. Participants were
equally conﬁdent, however, when making judgments for
control items (M = 4.25, SD = .66) and misled items (M =
4.19, SD = .74), t(296) = 1.26, p = .21, d = .14. For every one
of the eight critical items, participants were more accurate
when it appeared for them as a control item than when it
appeared for them as a misled item. A paired t-test
revealed that overall, items were better remembered as
controls than as misled items, t(7) = 7.36, p < .001, d =
2.55. Because there are only four misinformation items
and four control items that are counterbalanced for each
half of the participants, reliability estimates for these
items were not calculated.
Source monitoring judgments. For each test item, partici-
pants indicated whether they remembered their answers
from the video, the narrative, both, or neither. False mem-
ories of critical items combined with source misattributions
to either the video or to both the video and the narrative
constitute robust false memories. The proportions of
robust false memories for misleading details in the misin-
formation condition (M = .42, SD = .25) is signiﬁcantly
higher than the proportion of the same source misattribu-
tions for falsely-endorsed misleading details in the control
condition (M = .15, SD = .16), t(292) = 15.65, p < .001, d =
1.30. When robust false memories are calculated as pro-
portions of all falsely remembered items, rather than out
of all test items, the proportions are approximately equal
between critical and control items t(186) = .72, p = .47, d
= .07.
The Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm
Recognition rates. The recognition rate for studied items
was fairly high (M = .68, SD = .20) and that of distractor
items fairly low (M = .30, SD = .18). Critical lures were
falsely recognised at a fairly high rate as well (M = .63, SD
= .15). Tests of within-subjects contrasts revealed a signiﬁ-
cant diﬀerence between recognition rates of critical and
studied items, though the size of the eﬀect is small, F(1,
281) = 17.33, p < .001, h2p = .06. There was a strong, posi-
tive correlation between endorsement rates of studied
items and critical lures, r = .60, p < .001, illuminating the
associative nature of memory in this paradigm. However,
there is a large and statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
between the mean recognition rates of critical and
studied items combined and the recognition rate of dis-
tractor items, F(1, 281) = 1219.77, p < .001, h2p = .81. Of
the 15 DRM lists utilised, both the king and mountain lists
produced the lowest endorsement rates of their critical
lures (M = .51, SD = .50) while both the sweet and window
lists produced the highest endorsement rate of their critical
lures (M = .79, SD = .41). Internal consistency of recognition
rates was α = .67 for critical items (15 items), α = .82 for
studied items was (45 items), and α = .91 for distractor
items (60 items).
When participants indicated an item as studied at test,
they were also asked to indicate whether they had an
actual memory for having seen an item or mere belief
that they had seen the item (but without any sense of a
memory). Robust false DRM memories are deﬁned as
those false recollections of critical lures that are
accompanied by a memory judgment. Of all critical lures
presented at test, a sizeable minority of them were recog-
nised robustly (M = .20, SD = .16), and this proportion is not
statistically diﬀerent from the proportion of studied items
robustly recognised (M = .20, SD = .12; t(277) = 1.06, p
= .29, d = .07). These data support the notion that judg-
ments about critical lures are not simply based on criterion
shifts but rather indeed represent actual memory distor-
tion phenomena.
Conﬁdence judgments. Participants were equally
conﬁdent for their judgments about critical (M = 3.23, SD
= .69) studied (M = 3.23, SD = .66), and distractor items (M
= 3.23, SD = .65), Huynh-Feldt F(1.63,453.73) = .05, p = .92.
Conﬁdence within subjects for these three items is also
highly correlated, adjusted multiple r2 = .91. Adjusted mul-
tiple r2 statistics were calculated using the following
formula:
rz.xy =
NameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMeNameMe
r2xz + r2yz − 2rxzryzrxy
1− r2xy
√
The imagination inﬂation paradigm
Memory for having heard Session 1 statements. To
understand how imagination during Session 2 aﬀected
memory for action statements presented in Session 1,
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participants’ memories were tested during Session
3. Speciﬁcally, at test, participants were presented with a
number of action statements (including those presented
in Session 1 as well as some new, never-presented state-
ments) and indicated whether they remembered hearing
the statement during Session 1. They also provided a conﬁ-
dence judgment for their answer, again using a scale
anchored at 1 (Not Conﬁdent) to 5 (Very Conﬁdent).
Furthermore, if they did remember hearing the action
statement, they were asked to indicate whether they per-
formed, imagined, or only heard the action.
In order to analyze the memory data, each block of state-
ments was ﬁrst coded according to what the participant was
instructed to do with it in Session 1 as well as the number of
times that they imagined it in Session 2. This results in 12 cat-
egories of items at test; mean recognition rates for these
items appear in Figure 1. A 4 (Session 1 Item Type) × 3
(Number of Imaginations in Session 2) repeated-measures
ANOVAwas then performed to gauge howoften participants
remembered having heard these items in Session 3. For
the following analyses, wherever assumptions of sphericity
are violated, Huynh-Feldt F statistics are reported.
There was a main eﬀect of Session 1 Item Type: partici-
pants made correct Heard judgments most often to items
they had performed in Session 1 (M = .87, SD = .13). Their
rates of correct recognition were lower if they had imagined
the item in Session 1 (M = .67, SD = .16) and lower still if they
had merely heard the item in Session 1 (M = .54, SD= .11).
Unheard items were recognised as heard least often
(M = .44, SD = .16), Huynh-Feldt F(2.83, 688.45) = 575.11,
p < .001, h2p = .70. Furthermore, there was a main eﬀect of
imagination; statements that were not imagined at all in
Session 2 were recognised less often (M = .41, SD = .14)
than statements that were imagined once (M = .65, SD
= .15) or ﬁve times (M = .83, SD = .14), Huynh-Feldt F(1.87,
453.48) = 948.53, p < .001, h2p = .80. This relationship is
further qualiﬁed by a signiﬁcant interaction, Huynh-Feldt
F(1.87, 453.48) = 948.53, p < .001, h2p = .80. The eﬀect of
imagination, or the magnitude of the diﬀerence in memory
for events between not imagining, imagining once, and ima-
gining ﬁve times, was greatest for unheard statements.
Moreover, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA revealed
large diﬀerences in memory between non-imagined
Session 1 statements, F(3, 729) = 456.67, p < .001, h2p = .65.
Those diﬀerences are smaller for those statements imagined
once, F(3, 729) = 257.48, p < .001, h2p = .51, though the diﬀer-
ence still represents a large eﬀect. For statements that
were imagined ﬁve times, the eﬀect is smaller yet, Huynh-
Feldt F(2.762, 671.19) = 64.47, p < .001, h2p = .22.
Conﬁdence judgments for having heard Session 1 state-
ments. Recall that participants provided a conﬁdence
rating for their judgments of whether or not they heard a
particular statement during Session 1. A two-way repeated
measures ANOVA was performed on conﬁdence judg-
ments, and this test reveals a signiﬁcant eﬀect of Session
1 Item Type, F(3, 732) = 4.90, p = .002, h2p = .02. This
eﬀect is small, though post-hoc analyses (Helmert con-
trasts) indicate that conﬁdence for unheard statements
was signiﬁcantly lower than for the other types of state-
ments combined, F(1, 244) = 13.17, p < .001, h2p = .05.
However, there was no eﬀect of Session 2 imagination con-
dition (p = .22) or interaction of item type by imagination
(p = .84) on conﬁdence ratings. In other words, across all
Session 1 item types, memory judgments for actions
were made with equal conﬁdence regardless of whether
they were not imagined, imagined once, or imagined ﬁve
times. Furthermore, the range of conﬁdence judgments
for all 12 item types (all 12 cell means) is small; these
scores range from 3.73 to 3.87 on a 5-point scale.
Figure 1. Mean rates of Heard judgments for imagination inﬂation items by Session 1 presentation type and Session 2 imagination type. Error bars represent
95% within-subjects conﬁdence intervals.
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Memory for having performed Session 1 statements.
Participants who responded during Session 3 that they
had indeed heard a statement during Session 1 were also
asked to indicate whether they remembered performing,
imagining, or merely listening to that statement during
Session 1. Items judged as performed are depicted in
Figure 2, and the pattern of data is similar to the proportion
of remembered statements. Another 4 (Session 1 Item
Type) × 3 (Number of Imaginations in Session 2)
repeated-measures ANOVA revealed a main eﬀect of
Session 1 Item Type on the proportion of remembered
items deemed performed, Huynh-Feldt F(2.81, 684.79) =
65.21, p < .001, h2p = .21, and a main eﬀect of imagination,
Huynh-Feldt F(1.85, 448.22) = 90.25, p < .001, h2p = .27.
Again, a signiﬁcant interaction was also found, Huynh-
Feldt F(5.60, 1360.36) = 6.03, p < .001, h2p = .02.
It is worth noting that with zero imaginings, participants
reported actually having performed statements that they
did not even hear 3.01% of the time. This percentage
increases to 9.16% of the time for unheard statements that
were imagined once and increases even higher to 15.90%
of the time for unheard statements that were imagined
ﬁve times. This diﬀerence is statistically signiﬁcant, Huynh-
Feldt F(2.04, 410.44) = 69.94, p < .001, h2p = .22. These mem-
ories are perhaps most impressive in that participants claim
to have heard andperformed actions – like stacking checkers
or faking sneezes – that they never even heard.
Inter-paradigm relationships
In order to understand one’s propensity to develop false
memories across multiple tasks, correlations were analysed
between all three false memory tasks. Each of these
relationships is described separately below.
The misinformation and DRM paradigms
Both tasks produced two measures of false memory. In the
misinformation task, these measures are the proportion of
misinformation items recognised at test after having
encountered those items in the post-event narrative and
the proportion of these items that were robustly recog-
nised (i.e., that were recognised and that were
accompanied by a judgment of having seen the item in
either the video or the video and the narrative). In the
DRM, these measures include the proportion of critical
lures falsely recognised and the proportion of critical
lures that are robustly recognised (i.e., that are
accompanied by a Memory judgment). Correlations
between these measures appear in Table 2. There is a sig-
niﬁcant positive correlation between the endorsement rate
of critical lures in the DRM and both the proportion of mis-
information items endorsed, r = .14, p = .03, as well as the
proportion of misinformation items robustly endorsed, r
= .17, p = .01. There are only trend-level relationships,
however, between the proportion of robustly recognised
critical lures and both the proportion of misinformation
items endorsed, r = .11, p = .09, and the proportion of mis-
information items robustly endorsed, r = .11, p = .08.
The misinformation and imagination inﬂation
paradigms
Both false memory measures in the misinformation para-
digm were correlated with multiple false memory
Figure 2. Mean rates of Performed judgments for imagination inﬂation items by Session 1 presentation type and Session 2 imagination type. Error bars rep-
resent 95% within-subjects conﬁdence intervals.
Table 2. Pearson R correlations between false memory measures in the
misinformation and DRM paradigms.
Misinformation measures
DRM measures
Proportion of
misinformation items
recognised
Proportion of
misinformation items
robustly recognised
Proportion of critical
lures recognised
0.14* 0.17**
Proportion of critical
lures robustly
recognised
0.11† 0.11†
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01.
972 R. M. NICHOLS AND E. F. LOFTUS
measures in the imagination inﬂation paradigm. Namely,
false memories of interest include Heard judgments to
statements unheard in Session 1 but imagined in Session
2 as well as Performed judgments to statements that
were unheard, merely listened to, or imagined in Session
1 and later imagined in Session 2. The results of the corre-
lations of these measures to misinformation false memory
measures appear in Table 3. It is worth noting that corre-
lations involving imagination inﬂation items that were ima-
gined “at all” represent a collapse across items imagined
once and items imaged ﬁve times.
There is a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the
proportion of misinformation items recognised and the
proportion of Heard judgments for unheard items in
Session 1 that were imagined ﬁve times in Session 2, r
= .14, p = .03. When the misinformation variable in this
relationship is the proportion of robustly recognised
items, the correlation remains positive but only at a trend
level of signiﬁcance, r = .11, p = .08. There is also signiﬁcant,
positive correlation between the proportion of misinforma-
tion items robustly recognised and the proportion of Per-
formed judgments to items listened to in Session 1 and
imagined ﬁve times in Session 2, r = .15, p = .02. This
relationship holds when the imagination variable rep-
resents listened-to statements that are imagined either
once or ﬁve times, r = .13, p = .04. However, there is also a
trend-level negative relationship between the proportion
of misinformation items robustly recognised and the pro-
portion of Performed judgments to unheard items in
Session 1 that were imagined once in Session 2, r =−.12,
p = .06.
The DRM and imagination inﬂation paradigms
Both false memory measures in the DRM paradigm were
correlated with the same false memory measures in the
imagination inﬂation paradigm described above. These
correlations appear in Table 4. The proportion of critical
lures falsely recognised correlates signiﬁcantly with the
proportion of Performed judgments to items listened to
in Session 1 and imagined ﬁve times in Session 2, r = .17,
p = .01. This relationship holds when the imagination vari-
ables includes listened-to items that were imagined at all,
r = .16, p = .02.
When examining the relationships between imagin-
ation inﬂation false memories and robustly recognised criti-
cal lures, additional signiﬁcantly positive associations
emerge. For example, the proportion of robustly recog-
nised critical lures is positively correlated with the pro-
portion of Heard judgments for unheard statements in
Session 1 that are imagined once, r = .13, p = .04, imagined
ﬁve times, r = .13, p = .04, or imagined at all r = .17, p < .01.
Furthermore, robustly recognised lures are correlated with
the proportion of Performed judgments to unheard items in
Session 1 and imagined once in Session 2, r = .17, p < .01.
For items that are merely listened-to in Session 1, robustly
recognised critical lures are associated with Performed
judgments to these items when they are imagined once,
r = .17, p = .01, or imagined at all, r = .19, p < .01; this
relationship approaches signiﬁcance when these items
are imagined ﬁve times, r = .12, p = .05. Finally, for items
that are imagined in Session 1, robustly recognised critical
lures are associated with Performed judgments to these
items when they are imagined once, r = .14, p = .03, and
imagined at all, r = .13, p = .04.
Conﬁdence
Participants rated their conﬁdence on a scale of 1 (Not
Conﬁdent) to 5 (Very Conﬁdent) for their DRM recognition
judgments, judgments for misinformation test items and
judgments of whether a particular imagination inﬂation
item was heard or not (note that conﬁdence was not
assessed for judgments about whether an item deemed
Table 3. Pearson R correlations between false memory measures in the misinformation and imagination inﬂation paradigms.
Misinformation measures
Imagination inﬂation measures
Proportion of misinformation
items recognised
Proportion of misinformation
items robustly recognised
Proportion of Heard judgments for unheard items in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 −0.01 0.00
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.14* 0.11†
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.08 0.07
Proportion of Performed judgments for non-performed items in Session 1
Items unheard in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 −0.04 −0.12†
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.00 −0.02
Items imagined at all in Session 2 −0.02 −0.09
Items listened-to in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 −0.01 0.04
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.04 0.15*
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.02 0.13*
Items imagined in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 0.08 0.08
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.07 0.04
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.10 0.08
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
†p < .10; *p < .05.
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heard in Session 1 was performed, imagined, or merely lis-
tened-to at that time). There is a trend-level positive corre-
lation between conﬁdence for misinformation items and
conﬁdence for critical lures, r = .11, p = .09, and a signiﬁcant
positive correlation between conﬁdence for misinforma-
tion items and conﬁdence for unheard, imagined items, r
= .19, p < .01. A strong positive correlation exists between
conﬁdence for critical lures and conﬁdence judgments
for unheard, imagined items, r = .59, p < .001. All three
conﬁdence judgments are also positively correlated,
adjusted multiple r2 = .15.
Individual diﬀerences
Table 5 contains descriptive statistics for the demographic
and personality variables measured in this investigation.
These descriptives include the number of observations,
the minimum and maximum scores, the mean and stan-
dard deviation, the skewness and kurtosis, and Cronbach’s
alpha (where relevant) of each variable. The relationships
of these variables to memory phenomena are ﬁrst dis-
cussed within the context of each paradigm.
The misinformation paradigm
Correlational analyses were conducted to examine which
relationships, if any, exist between demographic/personal-
ity variables and memory measures in the misinformation
paradigm. These Pearson R correlations appear in
Table 6. As this table shows, there are no signiﬁcant individ-
ual diﬀerence correlates with either overall or robust false
memory. However, three personality scales are associated
with conﬁdence judgments for misinformation items: con-
scientiousness (r = .19, p < .001), Need for Cognition (r = .12,
p = .04), and dissociative experiences (r =−.16, p = .01). Dis-
crimination scores of the Over-claiming Questionnaire are
positively associated with accuracy for control items in
the misinformation task (r = .13, p = .03), but no other indi-
vidual diﬀerence variables predict overall accuracy, robust
accuracy, or conﬁdence judgments for control items.
The DRM paradigm
Correlations were examined between the same individual
diﬀerence variables and measures of memory in the DRM
task. Several more relationships emerge for the DRM than
for the misinformation paradigm; these correlations appear
in Table 7. Speciﬁcally, total false recognition of critical
lures is associated with the Cognitive Reﬂection Task (CRT)
in terms of both the number of intuitive answers given in
the task (r = .25, p < .001) and the number of correct
answers given to the task (r =−.20, p = .001). The number
of correct answers given to the CRT is also associated with
a decrease in robustly recognised critical lures (r =−.12, p
= .04). A higher score on the Anomalous/Paranormal Experi-
ence Subscale of the Anomalous Experiences Inventory (AEI),
on the other hand, is associated with increase in robustly
recognised lures (r = .13, p = .04). In terms of conﬁdence
judgments for critical lures, only OCQ discrimination scores
are associated such judgments (r =−.23, p < .001).
When examining veridical memory, overall recognition
of studied items was associated only with the sum of intui-
tive answers given to the CRT (r = .13, p = .03). Robustly
recognised studied items are correlated only with the Crea-
tive Experiences Questionnaire (r = .12, p = .04). Conﬁdence
judgments for studied items, on the other hand, is associ-
ated with OCQ discrimination scores (r =−.21, p < .001),
absorption (r = .13, p = .03), and religiosity (r = .13, p = .03).
The imagination inﬂation paradigm
As was calculated for the DRM, correlations were computed
between measures of memory in the imagination inﬂation
paradigm and individual diﬀerence variables of interest;
these correlations appear in Table 8. For the sake of
Table 4. Pearson R correlations between false memory measures in the DRM and imagination inﬂation paradigms.
DRM measures
Imagination inﬂation measures
Proportion of critical
lures recognised
Proportion of critical lures
robustly recognised
Proportion of Heard judgments for unheard items in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 0.04 0.13*
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.10 0.13*
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.09 0.17**
Proportion of Performed judgments for non-performed items in Session 1
Items unheard in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 0.01 0.17**
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 −0.02 0.00
Items imagined at all in Session 2 −0.01 0.09
Items listened-to in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 0.04 0.17**
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.17** 0.12†
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.16* 0.19**
Items imagined in Session 1
Items imagined once in Session 2 0.03 0.14*
Items imagined ﬁve times Session 2 0.05 0.05
Items imagined at all in Session 2 0.05 0.13*
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
†p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01.
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parsimony, false memories are represented in these ana-
lyses through only two variables. The ﬁrst is the proportion
of Heard judgments to statements unheard in Session 1
and imagined at all in Session 2 (collapsed across state-
ments imagined once and statements imagined ﬁve
times). The second is the proportion of Performed judg-
ments to statements that were not performed in Session
1 (collapsed across unheard, listened-to, and imagined
statements) and imagined at all in Session 2 (again col-
lapsed across statements imagined once and statements
imagined ﬁve times). True memories were assessed
through two similarly constructed variables. The ﬁrst is
Heard judgments to statements that were heard in
Session 1 (collapsed across listened-to, imagined, and per-
formed statements) and not imagined in Session 2. The
second is Performed judgments to statements that were
performed in Session 1 and not imagined in Session
2. Accurate memories operationalised this way are most
akin to memory accuracy for control items in the misinfor-
mation paradigm.
In terms of false memory, several individual diﬀerence
measures were correlated with both false Heard judgments
and Performed judgments after imagination. These
includes trait agreeableness (Heard: r =−.14, p = .03; Per-
formed: r =−.14, p = .03), OCQ Bias scores (Heard: r =−.14,
p = .03; Performed: r =−.18, p < .01), and dissociative experi-
ences (Heard: r = .13, p < .05; Performed: r = .20, p < .01). Fur-
thermore, false Performed judgments are also associated
with absorption (r = .15, p = .02) and anomalous experi-
ences (r = .13, p < .05). Conﬁdence judgments for
Table 5. Descriptive statistics for demographic and personality measures.
Measure N Min Max M SD Skewness Kurtosis Cronbach’s α
Age 367 18.00 55.00 20.77 3.64 4.27 27.66 –
Proportion of life speaking English 360 .10 1.00 0.90 0.19 −2.20 4.60 –
Estimated GPA 342 .50 4.50 3.11 0.59 −0.55 0.55 –
Big Five – Extraversion 365 1.00 6.00 3.37 0.82 −0.18 −0.20 0.86
Big Five – Agreeableness 365 2.13 6.00 3.88 0.59 −0.26 −0.03 0.71
Big Five – Conscientiousness 365 1.89 6.00 3.64 0.65 0.09 −0.09 0.77
Big Five – Neuroticism 365 1.00 6.00 3.10 0.83 −0.03 −0.15 0.84
Big Five – Openness 365 1.60 6.00 3.51 0.61 −0.06 0.66 0.76
OCQ – Discrimination 366 −2.52 3.37 0.00 1.00 0.18 0.00 –
OCQ – Bias 366 −2.70 2.17 0.00 1.00 −0.52 0.16 –
NFC 364 24.00 125.00 80.09 18.20 −0.08 0.04 0.86
FI 365 28.00 84.00 57.94 11.11 −0.23 −0.16 0.85
CRT – Sum of Intuitive Answers 364 0.00 3.00 2.05 1.02 −0.71 −0.71 –
CRT – Sum of Correct Answers 364 0.00 3.00 0.59 0.89 1.38 0.84 –
VVIQ 365 1.81 5.00 3.80 0.68 −0.40 −0.46 0.95
DES 365 0.00 100.00 29.94 16.89 0.62 0.51 0.94
TAS 363 2.00 51.00 17.12 8.30 0.72 0.65 0.87
CEQ 364 0.00 22.00 9.26 4.44 0.10 −0.41 0.76
AUROS 334 10.00 100.00 52.11 16.33 −0.36 −0.70 0.91
AEI 364 0.00 20.00 4.97 3.31 1.34 2.71 –
Table 6. Pearson R correlations between demographic and personality variables and misinformation variables.
Misinformation items Control items
Measure
Overall false
memory
Robust false
memory Conﬁdence
Overall veridical
memory
Robust veridical
memory Conﬁdence
Age −0.03 0.01 0.03 0.07 −0.04 0.09
Proportion of life speaking English 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.09 −0.08 −0.06
Estimated GPA −0.08 0.04 0.09 0.00 −0.02 −0.02
Big Five – Extraversion 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.04 0.03 0.04
Big Five – Agreeableness −0.01 0.01 0.06 0.00 0.00 −0.05
Big Five – Conscientiousness 0.04 0.09 0.19*** −0.01 0.05 0.06
Big Five – Neuroticism 0.04 −0.03 −0.04 −0.07 −0.01 −0.04
Big Five – Openness 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.04 −0.04
OCQ – Discrimination −0.10 −0.03 0.05 0.13* −0.07 0.00
OCQ – Bias 0.01 0.08 0.05 0.07 −0.01 −0.01
NFC −0.10 −0.01 0.12* 0.00 0.04 0.04
FI 0.01 −0.01 0.03 0.01 −0.01 −0.01
CRT Intuitive Answers 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.00 0.03 0.04
CRT Correct Answers −0.07 −0.05 0.03 0.07 −0.08 0.00
VVIQ −0.02 0.06 0.02 −0.01 −0.02 0.06
DES 0.01 −0.06 −0.16** −0.09 0.03 −0.09
TAS −0.01 −0.06 −0.11 −0.08 0.01 −0.02
CEQ 0.07 0.03 −0.07 −0.08 0.06 −0.02
AUROS 0.10 0.07 0.03 −0.02 0.00 −0.05
AEI 0.07 −0.02 −0.05 −0.03 0.00 −0.06
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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unheard, later imagined statements is associated with both
OCQ discrimination (r =−.15, p = .02) and OCQ bias (r = .13,
p = .04).
In the absence of any imagination, accurate Heard judg-
ments are associated with OCQ bias (r =−.21, p = .001) and
dissociative experiences (r = .14, p = .03). Accurate Performed
judgments are also positively associated with dissociative
experiences, (r = .13, p = .04). Conﬁdence for items that
were heard but not imagined is associated with estimated
GPA (r =−.16, p = .02), OCQ discrimination (r =−.17, p < .01),
Faith in Intuition (r = .17, p < .01), religiosity (r = .19, p < .01),
and anomalous experiences (r = .13, p < .05).
Discussion
Inter-paradigm relationships
We assessed overall and robust false memories in the mis-
information paradigm, overall and robust false memories in
the DRM, and false Heard and false Performed judgments to
several items in the imagination inﬂation task. Small but
statistically signiﬁcant correlations emerged between
some false memory variables in each of the three compari-
sons. Every signiﬁcant correlation is positive, but again,
they are typically rather modest: Pearson R coeﬃcients
range from r = .14 to r = .17 between false memories in
Table 7. Pearson R correlations between demographic and personality variables and DRM variables.
Critical lures Studied items
Measure
Overall false
memory
Robust false
memory Conﬁdence
Overall veridical
memory
Robust veridical
memory Conﬁdence
Age −0.06 0.07 −0.10 −0.05 −0.03 −0.08
Proportion of life speaking English 0.10 0.06 −0.09 0.01 0.01 −0.07
Estimated GPA −0.10 −0.03 −0.09 −0.10 −0.04 −0.12
Big Five – Extraversion −0.02 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.05 0.02
Big Five – Agreeableness −0.03 −0.08 0.10 −0.02 −0.03 0.09
Big Five – Conscientiousness −0.01 −0.01 0.07 0.02 −0.06 0.08
Big Five – Neuroticism 0.08 0.02 0.00 0.10 0.02 −0.03
Big Five – Openness −0.06 0.01 −0.01 −0.03 0.03 0.00
OCQ – Discrimination −0.05 −0.05 −0.23** −0.02 −0.07 −0.21***
OCQ – Bias 0.04 −0.02 0.02 0.01 −0.07 0.04
NFC −0.07 −0.04 −0.07 −0.05 −0.04 −0.09
FI −0.02 0.10 0.05 −0.01 0.11 0.08
CRT Intuitive Answers 0.25*** 0.09 0.01 0.13* 0.09 0.01
CRT Correct Answers −0.20** −0.12* −0.03 −0.06 −0.11 −0.04
VVIQ −0.02 0.10 0.09 −0.02 0.10 0.05
DES −0.06 −0.02 0.02 −0.02 −0.01 0.05
TAS −0.05 0.02 0.09 0.00 0.08 0.13*
CEQ 0.08 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.12* 0.06
AUROS 0.06 0.11 0.11 0.05 0.07 0.13*
AEI 0.01 0.13* 0.03 0.02 0.11 0.05
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 8. Pearson R correlations between demographic and personality variables and imagination inﬂation variables.
False memories True memories
Measure Heard judgments Performed judgments Conﬁdence Heard judgments Performed judgments Conﬁdence
Age 0.04 0.06 0.03 −0.08 0.00 −0.06
Proportion of life speaking English −0.05 −0.04 −0.02 0.01 −0.01 −0.08
Estimated GPA −0.01 −0.10 −0.09 −0.07 0.01 −0.16*
Big Five – Extraversion −0.06 0.01 0.01 0.07 −0.03 0.08
Big Five – Agreeableness −0.14* −0.14* 0.08 −0.09 −0.04 0.07
Big Five – Conscientiousness −0.06 −0.01 0.09 −0.05 −0.11 0.05
Big Five – Neuroticism 0.06 0.04 −0.04 0.00 −0.01 0.04
Big Five – Openness −0.03 0.04 0.01 0.04 −0.03 0.03
OCQ – Discrimination 0.04 −0.05 −0.15* −0.02 −0.09 −0.17**
OCQ – Bias −0.14* −0.18** 0.13* −0.21** −0.08 0.08
NFC 0.00 −0.05 −0.03 0.04 −0.10 −0.04
FI 0.00 0.04 0.08 −0.05 0.02 0.17**
CRT Intuitive Answers 0.03 −0.08 0.09 −0.03 −0.05 0.05
CRT Correct Answers 0.04 0.00 −0.12 0.03 −0.01 −0.02
VVIQ 0.00 −0.03 0.04 −0.04 0.00 0.09
DES 0.13* 0.20** 0.02 0.14* 0.13* 0.03
TAS 0.06 0.15* 0.11 0.07 0.04 0.12
CEQ 0.03 0.08 0.11 0.05 0.09 0.11
AUROS −0.02 0.12 0.12 −0.01 0.00 0.19**
AEI 0.12 0.13* 0.06 0.00 0.05 0.13*
Note: Correlations in bold are statistically signiﬁcant at p < .05 or smaller.
*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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the misinformation paradigm and DRM (consistent with
Zhu et al., 2013), r = .13 to r = .15 between misinformation
false memories and imagined false memories, and from r
= .13 to r = .19 between false memories in the DRM and
imagined false memories.
Concerning the misinformation and imagination
inﬂation tasks, correlations emerged between total false
misinformation memories and false Heard judgments to
items unheard but imagined ﬁve times as well as
between robust false misinformation memories and false
Performed judgments to items listened-to in Session 1
and later imagined once or ﬁve times. False memories in
both paradigms may arise from source monitoring failures
through external suggestion (misinformation) or direction
(imagination). Though speculative, this could account for
the positive correlations revealed here. However, the
number and magnitude of these three correlations
should not be overstated; the 21 other possible corre-
lations between false memories are not signiﬁcant.
Other correlations emerged between DRM false mem-
ories and imagined false memories. Speciﬁcally, total
false recognition of lures was associated with Performed
judgments to items listened to in Session 1 and later ima-
gined. Robustly remembered lures, on the other hand,
were associated with false Heard judgments and false Per-
formed judgments across every major category of item (see
Table 4). Because robustly recognised lures are those for
which participants report an actual memory of having
seen the item, rather than a mere belief that they saw it,
these particular memories are better explained by acti-
vation-monitoring theories than are total false recognition
of the lures. Source monitoring failures also likely account
for false memories arising from imagination inﬂation; par-
ticipants may develop these memories when they cannot
accurately identify the source of their memory as their
Session 2 imagination instead of that which occurred in
Session 1. From a monitoring perspective, therefore, it is
not surprising to ﬁnd more relationships between ima-
gined memories and robust false recognition of lures
than imagined memories and total false recognition of
lures. However, a test of shared monitoring failures
amongst the paradigms was not a component of this
study.
Remarkably, conﬁdence judgments for false memory
items in all three paradigms were correlated. These corre-
lations are small between judgments for misinformation
items and both critical lures and imagination items, but
the correlation between conﬁdence judgments for critical
lures and imagined items was strikingly large (r = .59).
The correlation between conﬁdence for studied items in
the DRM and heard but unimagined items in the imagin-
ation inﬂation paradigm was also correlated, though to a
far lesser degree. The most obvious similarities between
DRM judgments and imagination inﬂation judgments are
that they involve a yes-no recognition test, while the mis-
information paradigm does not, and both tests occurred
during Session 3 while the misinformation paradigm took
place entirely in Session 2. It could be the case that a
global sense of conﬁdence during Session 3 aﬀected feel-
ings of certainty for memory judgments, and perhaps if
the misinformation test was also given in Session 3, the cor-
relations between conﬁdence judgments for misinforma-
tion items would be stronger.
It is no surprise that these correlations are small for
some comparisons and altogether absent in many of the
others. Several distinctions between the paradigms help
to explain limits of inter-paradigm relationships. DRM
false memories are the result of spontaneous internal pro-
cesses, misinformation memories arise through external
suggestion, and imagination inﬂation develops when
what was imagined confounds what was real. Imagin-
ation-inﬂated memories are autobiographical in nature,
whereas misinformation memories concern an external
event, and the DRM produces false memories more so
through semantic rather than episodic memory stores.
The DRM also spans two crucial phases (encoding and
test) while the misinformation and imagination paradigms
span three (encoding, suggestion/imagination, and test).
These tasks are quite diﬀerent in terms of their methods
but also in how they are ultimately experienced by the par-
ticipant. When considering whether some people may
have a “false memory trait”, it is important also to consider
that the dissimilarities between these paradigms may
simply trump the fact that they all produce false memories
of one kind or another (consistent with Bernstein et al.’s
[2018] article title, “‘False Memory’ is a linguistic
convenience”).
Individual diﬀerences
A large number of individual diﬀerences were examined in
this study as potential predictors of false memories. As the
number of comparisons increases, so too does the prob-
ability of committing Type I errors (false positive corre-
lations). Nevertheless, relatively few of these measures
predict memory – veridical or illusory – in the three para-
digms. When taken together in an ordinary least squares
multiple regression analysis, the 19 predictors do not
account for a signiﬁcant amount of the variance in the pro-
portion of misinformation items recognised (p = .61) critical
lures recognised (p = .09), or false Heard judgments to
unheard, imagined items (p = .33), despite large sample
sizes for each paradigm (n = 244–297 after attrition) and
no problems with collinearity or residual diagnostics.
Therefore, each of the predictors is discussed in the
context of individual paradigms.
In the misinformation task, there are zero signiﬁcant
individual diﬀerence correlates of false memory. These
include failures to replicate relationships founds in the lit-
erature between misinformation false memories and vivid-
ness of visual imagery, the agreeableness and openness
subscales of the Big Five personality inventory, and disso-
ciative experiences. This may be due in part to methodo-
logical and analytical diﬀerences between the reported
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studies and this one. For example, Tomes and Katz (1997)
compared Vividness of Visual Imagery Questionnaire
scores between participants who endorsed all three misin-
formation items in their design to those who endorsed
fewer than three misinformation items. Though dichotomi-
sation of continuous variables may reveal group diﬀer-
ences where none exist in correlational analyses, there
are several limits of this approach that result in more
liberal analysis (Irwin & McClelland, 2003; Maxwell &
Delaney, 1993). Furthermore, Eisen and Carlson (1998)
report signiﬁcant positive correlations between misinfor-
mation errors and both dissociative experiences and
absorption, but these correlations are signiﬁcant at the p
< .05 level only with one-tailed tests. All analyses con-
ducted in this investigation were calculated with two-
tailed tests given adequate statistical power to detect
diﬀerences (i.e., post-hoc power analyses revealed Power
[1 – β error] = .99 to detect a medium-sized correlation
between absorption and misinformation errors in this
study).
In the DRM, the Cognitive Reﬂection Task is most highly
correlated with the proportion of lures falsely remembered.
More speciﬁcally, the total sum of intuitive answers is posi-
tively correlated with false memories while the total sum of
correct answers is negatively correlated. These relation-
ships may be explained by the fact that the CRT is designed
to lure respondents into providing an intuitive but incor-
rect answer, much in the way that the DRM is designed
to lure respondents into endorsing intuitive but never pre-
sented critical items at test. Conversely, the ability to sup-
press an intuitive, System 1 (Stanovich & West, 2000)
thought process to arrive at correct answer in the CRT
may be related to the ability to resist endorsement of a
critical lure. Frederick (2005) also describes his CRT as a
test that requires cognitive ability in order to generate
correct answers; the negative correlation between correct
answers and critical lures is therefore compatible with
ﬁndings that suggest cognitive ability, measured through
a variety of tasks, is negatively correlated with false mem-
ories in the DRM (Zhu et al., 2010b). Surprisingly, OCQ dis-
crimination (a proxy for cognitive ability in this study) is not
signiﬁcantly associated with false memories. Research has
shown that working memory capacity is somewhat protec-
tive against the development of DRM errors (Watson et al.,
2005), but discrimination scores on the OCQ discrimination
depend on a subject’s familiarity with pieces of general,
trivial-like knowledge rather than working memory
capabilities.
Finally, one’s propensity to develop false memories after
imagination is correlated with a few of the individual diﬀer-
ence variables. For example, both an increase in false Heard
and false Performed judgments are associated with a
decrease in agreeableness. Though some have decried
misinformation eﬀects as an acquiescence to demand
characteristics or others social pressures (McCloskey & Zar-
agoza, 1985), this ﬁnding does not support that claim. False
Heard and false Performed judgments are also associated
with a decrease in OCQ bias scores and an increase in dis-
sociativity. This latter relationship conﬁrms the results of
previous studies (Heaps & Nash, 1999; Hyman & Billings,
1998). False Performed judgments here are also associated
with absorption and anomalous experiences. Absorption
has been shown to be associated with an increase in
more naturally occurring false autobiographical memories
(Platt et al., 1998), and those who are more prone to
absorption in their environments may be more suggestible
in a variety of contexts, imagination inﬂation notwithstand-
ing. Those who report having more anomalous experiences
may also be prone to developing false autobiographical
memories because the anomalous experiences they
report may themselves be confabulations. Interestingly,
anomalous experiences are associated only with false Per-
formed judgments, not with false Heard judgments;
perhaps reports of events that are as extreme and unlikely
as those listed in the AEI (e.g., “At times, I have felt pos-
sessed by an outside force”) are associated only with
reports as extreme and unlikely as performing an action
statement that was not even encountered in Session 1.
To summarise, several individual diﬀerence variables
were investigated as predictors of false memory in the mis-
information, DRM, and imagination inﬂation paradigms.
Very few are signiﬁcantly correlated with false memories,
and those that did correlate represent small and small-to-
medium sized eﬀects. The only common predictor to
false memories in multiple paradigms is one’s report of
anomalous experiences, and this predicts both robust
false memories in the DRM and false Performed judgments
to unheard, imagined items in the imagination inﬂation
paradigm to the same degree (r = .13). The relative inability
of these variables to predict false memories is consistent
with the Dual Encoding Interference hypothesis (Patihis,
2018). This hypothesis posts that in a misinformation
task, traits that enhance encoding will support encoding
of both true and false memories. Similarly, traits that
weaken encoding will result in both weak misinformation
memory and weak memory for original event details.
Both types of traits will produce a moderate probability
of false memory that might be akin to someone that
possess neither high nor very low amounts of the trait,
resulting in a null correlation. This may be particularly
applicable to other false memories involving source moni-
toring failures like those arising from imagination inﬂation.
The relevance of this hypothesis to DRM false memories is
limited, however, as DRM lures are not encoded at the time
of study.
Practical implications
If it is the case that we are all vulnerable to memory distor-
tion, then this has important implications for both clinical
and legal practitioners. In a court case, for example, an
expert witness (whom we will call Dr. B) denounced the
idea that an alleged abuse victim was likely to have experi-
enced false memories about her abuse given her low
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scores on the Gudjonsson Suggestibility Scale (Doe v. Hart-
ford Roman Catholic, 2014). This scale (Gudjonsson, 1984)
employs a misinformation-type methodology, with an orig-
inal event described in a narrative, to gauge how willing
people are both to yield to suggestive questions and to
shift their initial responses in the face of social pressure.
To date, there is no published evidence to indicate that
scores on this scale predict other types of false memories,
just as misinformation false memories are not strongly cor-
related with DRM or imagination false memories in this
study. A clinician who wishes to follow Dr. B’s approach,
however, may feel liberty to employ a controversial thera-
peutic technique because his or her client has a low GSS
score, recognises relatively few critical DRM lures, does
not seem to incorporate imaginations into her memory
for actual events, or through other tests, does not seem
to produce false memories to a large degree. This hypothe-
tical situation is reckless if not completely dangerous. Trial
outcomes may be unfairly inﬂuenced and people’s mem-
ories may be outright damaged by practices that remain
wholly unsupported by science.
Strengths, limitations and future directions
This study beneﬁts from a very large sample size for a
study whose procedures occurred in the laboratory span-
ning three separate sessions over two entire weeks. Fortu-
nately, the three paradigms utilised here produced false
memories as expected. This, in conjunction with the
large sample size, minimises the likelihood that null corre-
lations are the result of Type II (false negative) errors. This
within-subjects false memory study also includes imagin-
ation inﬂation as a measure of veriﬁable, false autobiogra-
phical memory. It is the ﬁrst to suggest minimal to
nonexistent relationships between imagined false mem-
ories and misinformation and DRM false memories.
Unlike uncorroborated false memories arising from
some types of false event suggestion, the false memories
in this study are fully known to be false and therefore oﬀer
a methodological advantage. Finally, whether a false
memory trait exists should be addressed not just by
examining relationships between false memories them-
selves, but also by identifying other factors that represent
shared variance among them. This multiple paradigms
study also includes the largest battery of individual diﬀer-
ence predictors to date.
However, limitations of this study must be addressed.
First, memory assessment varies among the three para-
digms. For example, the misinformation test contained
two-alternative, forced-choice recognition questions
while the DRM and imagination inﬂation test items
required yes-no recognition judgments. The misinforma-
tion tests lacked a third alternative: a novel item that was
not presented in either the original event nor in the misin-
formation narrative. The absence of this item may have
slightly inﬂated the misinformation eﬀect, but more impor-
tantly, similar control items were present in the both the
DRM (distractor items) and the imagination inﬂation para-
digm (unheard, unimagined items). This study lacks the
ability to compare endorsement rates of novel items
among all three paradigms. In a similar vein, the imagin-
ation inﬂation test did not contain a measure of robust
false memory such as the source judgments for misinfor-
mation items or, more relevant to imagination inﬂation,
remember/know judgments for DRM items. This limits to
ability to interpret any false heard, listened, or performed
judgment as arising from false memory rather than false
belief and prevents comparing memories with more recol-
lective qualities across all three tasks.
Another limitation of this study is that participants did
not have the opportunity to provide open-ended
responses. This means that information about the partici-
pants’ recollective experiences is limited to remember/
know judgments for DRM items and performed/ima-
gined/listened-to judgments for imagined items that
were judged as Heard. Information about a rememberer’s
subjective experiences is central component of false
memory theories, and some have claimed that false mem-
ories cannot be entirely understood without considering
them (Lampinen, Neuschatz, & Payne, 1997). Future
research would beneﬁt from allowing participants to
freely describe their subjective phenomenology in multiple
paradigms; content analysis could then shed light on
how experience allows researchers to describe all three
memory phenomena as false memory but also help elabor-
ate upon the small to null relationships discovered in this
research.
Another issue concerns the internal reliability of compo-
site measures used in this study. It is possible that relation-
ships between variables are not detected to the extent that
that the variables themselves do not have high internal
reliability (Spearman, 1904). While internal consistency
was suﬃcient for the individual diﬀerence measures (see
Table 5) and DRM memories (α = .67 for critical items, α
= .82 for studied items α = .91 for distractor items),
reliability estimates for false memories in the misinforma-
tion and imagination inﬂation tasks could not be calculated
due to item counterbalancing. However, the reliabilities
reported here are comparable or higher to those reported
by Ost et al. (2013), who noted that attenuation due to
limited reliability would have rendered the correlations
smaller but still discoverable.
In addition to addressing these limitations, future
research may beneﬁt from addressing the question of
trait susceptibility through other psychological lenses.
One of these is the use of neuroimaging. Functional MRI
(fMRI) studies have demonstrated meaningful patterns of
brain activity for true and false memories in both the mis-
information paradigm (Baym & Gonsalves, 2010; Okado &
Stark, 2005; Stark, Okado, & Loftus, 2010) and the DRM
(Cabeza, Rao, Wagner, Mayer, & Schacter, 2001; Schacter,
Buckner, Koutstaal, Dale, & Rosen, 1997), yet no one
study to date has compared structural or functional brain
diﬀerences in participants who complete multiple false
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memory tasks in the same study. This biological perspec-
tive may shed more light on the patterns of data discov-
ered here.
Furthermore, given the few, small correlations uncov-
ered between personality variables and false memories
in this study, researchers who are interested in further
exploring the relationships between false memory para-
digms may be interested in taking an experimental
rather than an individual diﬀerences approach. For
instance, researchers have studied the eﬀects of divided
attention on the production of false memories. In the
DRM, dividing participants’ attention at encoding has
been show to decrease false recognition of critical lures
while dividing their attention at retrieval has been
shown to increase critical lures (Knott & Dewhurst,
2007). In the misinformation task, participants whose
attention is divided at both encoding (Lane, 2006) and
retrieval (Zaragoza & Lane, 1998) are more likely to incor-
porate misleading suggestions into memory. Little is
known about how divided attention aﬀects the develop-
ment of false autobiographical memories, and nothing
is known about how it aﬀects diﬀerent types of false
memories within subjects. To the degree that divided
attention or any other manipulation aﬀects false mem-
ories in the same manner, more can be said about the
mechanisms shared by those paradigms.
Conclusion
The research question explored here is simply deﬁned, fun-
damental to understanding memory, and contributes to a
small but growing literature on an understudied question:
are there certain people who are prone to developing false
memories across multiple contexts? In summary, it seems
that the answer is no. The results of this one large study
fail to discover any substantial relationships between false
memories in three classic experimental paradigms: the mis-
information paradigm, the DRM, and imagination inﬂation.
There were small to null relationships between indices of
false memory among the three tasks, and while some indi-
vidual diﬀerences predict false memories to a small
degree, not one of the personality variables explored in
this study predicts false memories in all three contexts.
These data depict the ubiquitous nature of memory dis-
tortion. And even though the memories discussed here
were produced in the lab, real-world memories may be
inﬂuenced through the same means. When we attempt
to remember and therefore reconstruct our memories,
those memories may contain extra bits and pieces from
what we have heard, read, or seen from other sources;
from what seems to “ﬁt” based on schematic congruence;
or even from details generated through our own internal
replays and imaginations. Importantly, this research
demonstrates that distortions can worm their way into
very diﬀerent kinds of memories for us all, and no one
type of person is particularly vulnerable, nor particularly
resistant, to incorporating all diﬀerent kinds of those
extra bits and pieces into memory.
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